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The relationship between income and democracy has been widely investigated
since the beginning of the twentieth century. While Acemoglu et al. (2008) al-
ready argued that there is a positive association between both factors more than
twenty centuries ago, Lipset’s law formalized it by stating that higher economic
growth leads to a higher democracy level (Lipset, 1959). This law is (likely) the
foundation of the modernization theory that asserts economic development as the
major factor influencing the political environment. A number of authors, including
Barro (1999), Dahl (1971), Huntington (1993) or Stephens et al. (1992), addition-
ally contributed to the findings showing that higher incomes are associated with
higher levels of democracy.
Nevertheless, recent empirical findings show a less clear story. Some support
for a positive association between income and democracy is indeed found by Lon-
dregan and Poole (1996) when using panel data to estimate a causal relationship
as stated by Lipset (1959) but only after considering leadership type and political
context as control factors. Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) observe that the transition
to democracy is linked to a fractional shift of illiterate to primary school gradu-
ates and, to a lesser extent, to income per capita. Moral-Benito and Bartolucci
(2011) show instead a non-linear effect between income and democracy. Fayad
et al. (2012) specifically distinguish between income from natural resources and
other income. By applying heterogeneous panel techniques, the authors find that
only when income comes from non resource sources is it significant in explaining
democracy. Meanwhile, evidence of no causal relation has also been found by other
authors. Przeworski et al. (2000) do not find any significant relationships between
income per capita and transition to democracy when using a Markov transition
model. This lack of evidence challenging Lipset’s law is supported by Acemoglu
et al. (2008) who use a panel data approach. Their study concludes that a causal
effect from income to democracy cannot be found. However, a similar approach
from Cervellati et al. (2014) reveals that the effect of income on democracy exists
and it is heterogenous for former colonies and non-colonies.
One of the reasons why findings are inconclusive could be that the assump-
tions underlying the theoretical developments are inadequate. In this paper we
assume that causality goes from economic performance to democracy. In this set-
ting, an important issue is the choice of distributional assumption to approximate
democracy when modelling its mean in a regression specification. In particular,
most quantitative research assumes that the democracy variable is an unbounded
continuous variable that has a homogenous variance which fits with the normal dis-
tribution implicitly assumed in least squares estimation. Nevertheless, democracy
measurements are in general finite with the upper limit stated as “democratic” and
the lower limit as “autocratic”. Hence, the main novelty of this paper is to focus on
the distributional assumption of democracy, which has not yet been investigated in
the related literature.
We focus on the framework of Acemoglu et al. (2008) and contribute to the un-
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derstanding of this topic by evaluating the distributional assumption of democracy
and its influence on the estimates. The main results indicate that when democracy is
modeled with a zero-one-inflated beta regression (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004),
higher incomes in the past increase the probability of a country being democratic.
This finding is robust to changes in the data sources in most cases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we briefly discuss why the
research in this field generally comes to different conclusions and how this could
be related to our primary concern, namely distributional assumptions that are ques-
tionable. Zero-one inflated beta distribution and regression are outlined in Sec-
tion 2. We present our methodology in Section 3. The main results are presented
in Section 4. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
1 Distributional specification
The recent empirical literature on the income democracy nexus has dealt with
causality identification and omitted variable bias by using lags of the explanatory
variables instead of levels in the right hand side. Additionally, country fixed ef-
fects are used to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (see for ex-
ample Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2014)). However, there are other issues, namely
other sources of endogeneity, incomplete data, measurement error and the distri-
butional assumption for the variable democracy, all of which have not been fully
addressed or even ignored. In the related literature, some attention has been given
to endogeneity, incomplete data and measurement error (Acemoglu et al. (2008);
Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2011); Treier and Jackman (2008)). Conversely, in
this paper we focus on the latter to explore the zero-one inflated beta distribution
as an alternative distributional assumption for democracy.
A parametric regression model relies on a specific distribution to derive the
results. Assuming the normal distribution for the response variable given the ex-
planatory variables is a handy approximation to fulfill the parametric assumption
in the class of linear models. However, violations of this assumption makes any
results questionable. Moreover, a bounded variable is by definition not normally
distributed particularly when most observations are close to the boundaries. If this
is the case, the variable of interest should not be used as a dependent variable in an
ordinary least squares regression, which (at least implicitly) assumes normality for
inference.
For illustration purposes, Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables
representing the level of democracy from the Freedom House Political Right Index
and Polity IV data set as proxies for the level of democracy in a particular country1.
1Freedom House and Polity4 democracy variables are from Acemoglu et al. (2008). Among the
various proxies of democracy that are available, we stick to Acemoglu et al. (2008) perspective by
using their standardized indices from Freedom House and Polity IV for comparison purposes. The
Freedom House index is based on a rating system ranging from 1 to 7 where smaller numbers rep-
resent a higher Freedom Rating. Polity IV is a multidimensional measure of political environment
that is compressed into a scalar ranging from -10 to 10. Positive numbers are in favor of democ-
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Table 1: Summary statistics of standardized democracy indices between
1960-2000, 211 countries
Variable Observation Trimmed mean (5%) St. Dev. Min. Max.
Freedom House 4732 0.49 0.38 0 1
Polity IV 5173 0.48 0.39 0 1
Note: The trimmed mean is an aritmetic mean that discards sample at both tails of the distribution. Table 1
discards the lowest 5% and the highest 5% values.
The arithmetic mean is a natural characterization of the central tendency of a data
set in particular for normally distributed variables.
Having the normality assumption in mind, the usual interpretation of a mean
around 0.5 is that most of the countries are half democratic. The next step is to
plot a histogram and a density estimate to examine whether these approximate
something close to a bell-shape, which would indicate a normal distribution for the
democracy variables.
Figure 1 illustrates that neither Freedom House nor Polity IV show such a bell-
shaped curve. Instead, their distributions are closer to a U-shaped curve with two
peaks. As a consequence the unimodal interpretation no longer holds and the arith-
metic mean does not represent the true central tendency, because it is a product
of a compromise between two modes that center around zero and one. Therefore,
it is the shape of the distributions and not the means that tell us something well-
known, which is that most of the countries are either highly democratic or highly
autocratic. A few data points are in between, and some of them could be the coun-
tries in transition to democracy or to authoritarian regimes. If the conclusion is
misleading for the arithmetic mean with the misspecified distribution, it will also
be potentially misleading for the parameters of a regression model based on the
misspecified distributional assumption.
An additional issue is that the values of democracy are bounded. Without con-
sidering this aspect when modeling the distribution of the data, the fitted values
could lay outside the interval [0,1]. In this case, we should consider nonlinear
models that take care of the nonlinearity and the bounded characteristics of the
response variable.
It is important to take note of another prominent feature shown in Figure 2. In
particular, the plot of the distributions indicates that the world is polarized into two
clear political regimes. We visually tested whether the lower mode comes from
non-OECD countries and the higher one depicts OECD countries by plotting the
subset of OECD and non-OECD according to Freedom House and Polity IV in
Figure 22.
racy while negative numbers symbolize autocracy. Standardization transforms both scales into the
identical range between zero and one.
2OECD refers to all members of OECD in 2014. Therefore, OECD is a loose term referring to
the members of OECD during the sample period as well as its future members.
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Figure 1: Histogram and density plot of democracy between 1960-2000, 211 coun-
tries
Note: The solid density lines have a smoothing bandwitdth of 1 and the dotted ones double the bandwidth.
Figure 2: Histogram and density plot of subsamples between 1960-2000, Freedom
House (left) and Polity IV (right)
Note: The solid density lines have a smoothing bandwitdth of 1 and the dotted ones double the bandwidth.
The visual examination of Figure 2 suggests that the OECD group approxi-
mates the upper mode of the distribution, while the non-OECD subsample repre-
sents the lower mode. Moreover, the OECD group shows more variability. We
anticipate that the high variation within the OECD sub-sample comes from the
earlier period of the sample, seeing how nowadays all OECD countries are demo-
cratic. We will incorporate these features into the model to assess the statistical
differences between both groups in the following parts.
2 Zero-one-inflated beta distribution and regression
A number of issues related to the suitable modeling strategy for bounded response
variables have been discussed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) under the heading
of fractional response models. Possible extensions have also been recently summa-
rized by Ramalho et al. (2011). The authors find that it is not reasonable to assume
that the effect of explanatory variables is constant throughout the entire range of
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the response variable when the latter is bounded. They also argue that a beta distri-
bution is not suitable for modelling bounded responses if values on the boundaries
are observed with non-zero probability. However, while allowing for values on
the boundaries, fractional response models only restrict the expectation of the re-
sponse to the interval (0,1) and not the complete distribution. Rather than using
a fractional response specification, we therefore inflate the beta distribution with
point masses in zero and one to account for the non-zero probability of observing
these boundary values.
The mixed discrete-continuous density of a zero-one-inflated beta random vari-
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where a > 0, b > 0.
The zero-one-inflated beta regression where the zero-one-inflated beta distri-
bution is considered as the conditional distribution of the response was introduced
by Ospina and Ferrari (2010). For the sake of interpretability, they propose a pa-
rameterization based on the expectation µ = aa+b and the scale parameter vector
s = 1a+b+1 with µ 2 (0,1) and s 2 (0,1). They also replace the probabilities for
zero and one by the parameters n = p0/p2 and t = p1/p2 where p2 = 1  p0   p1
is the probability observing a response from the continuous part of the zero-one-
inflated beta distribution. This parameterisation ensures that the probabilities for
zero, one and the continuous part add up to one.
Furthermore, we let yit be independent random variables where each yit follows
the density in (1) with mean µit , unknown scale parameter sit and zero/one inflation
parameters nit and tit , while t = 1, . . . ,T and i = 1, . . . ,N index the time dimension
and the individuals, respectively. To relate the parameters of the zero one inflated







nit = exp(hnit ) tit = exp(htit )
where hµit , hsit , hnit and htit are regression predictors constructed from a set of co-
variates. The logit transformation applied to the mean and scale parameter enables
a log odds ratio interpretation for two observations that only differ by one unit in
the variable of interest. In contrast, the natural log transformation for the zero/one
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inflation parameters is directly interpretable since it is approximately proportional
to differences3.
Note that the model allows us to account for heteroscedasticity due to the re-




is also a function of the mean µit and proportional to the scale parameter sit =
1/(1+ait +bit).
Even though the approach by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) also does not ex-
clude the boundary values, it is more suitable when the truly fractional component
of the response is dominant. Conversely, the inflated beta regression better matches
our data sets because we observe a large fraction of zeros and ones. Furthermore,
the fully parametric approach used by assuming a beta distribution for the frac-
tional response variable leads to more efficient ML estimators (Ospina and Ferrari,
2010).
3 Model specification
Our study estimates a similar model to Acemoglu et al. (2008)4. We use Maddison
historical GDP per capita5 for a robustness check of measurement error and miss-
ing values. Hence, we have the combination of two democracy variables and two
income per capita variables. We add a dummy variable for OECD membership,
which acts as an additional regressor in each model. The OECD dummy is used
as a parsimonious way to control for other factors that could impact democracy
-besides income- and are also associated to economic development. Nevertheless,
since being an OECD member is surely associated to income levels, in order to ob-
tain also the full impact of income on democracy -and not only the partial impact-
the model is also estimated withouth the OECD dummy. Moreover, another ver-
sion of the model is estimated with the OECD dummy lagged several periods to
avoid endogeneity issues.
We implement a linear model structure with fixed-effects under the assumption
that the response follows the zero-one inflated beta distribution where the basic
predictor structure is given by
hit = b1yit s +b2x1it s +b3x2it +Ji +dt (2)
where x1it s is log income per capita of country i at time t   s, x2it is the OECD
dummy of country i at time t, Ji is a country-specific fixed effect, dt is a time-
specific fixed effect, and the predictor is linked to the parameters of the response
3The probabilities for the point masses in zero and one then could be estimated by the equations:
p0 = n1+n+t , p1 =
t
1+n+t
4Linear model with country fixed-effects
5Maddison GDP per capita is from Bolt and van Zanden (2013) with authors’ adjustment.
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distribution via the link functions discussed above. For the lagged part in the pre-
dictor, we used s = 1 for yearly data6, s = 5 for five year, s = 10 for ten year
and s = 20 for twenty year data, respectively. We use five year averages of data
t = x̄5 and their first lag in equation (2) to mitigate endogeneity. We also employ
the lagged values of explanatory variables for the same purpose as well as to de-
sign the causality relationship. To fit zero-one-inflated beta regression models, we
used the R-package gamlss (R Core Team (2016); Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005);
Stasinopoulos et al. (2008)).
Because the zero-one-inflated beta regression allows us to estimate not only
the mean as a function of the explanatory variables but also the scale parameter,
which is proportional to the variance, and the two probabilities for zero and one in-
flation, we can infer the causes of potential non-constant variance, as well as other
distributional features of democracy at time t. Despite having a relatively suitable
distributional assumption and some treatment for other statistical challenges, we
do not claim that our estimation has a rigorous causal interpretation. Instead, our
intention is to provide a benchmark for future related research.
4 Results
4.1 Key findings
The main results of our model for different time intervals are presented in Table 2.
The first column shows the model estimated with five year data (model M1), the
second to third with ten (M2), twenty year (M3) intervals data, and the last column
is for five-year average data (M4). In each model, estimated coefficients are pre-
sented for the equation for µ which represents the mean of the beta distribution, the
equation for s which relates to the scale parameter of the beta distribution and the
equations for n and t which relate to the probabilities for zero and one inflation,
respectively 7.
The estimated coefficients for income per capita in the equation for µ are only
significant in model (M2), in which a ten year interval and a ten year lag struc-
ture is used. In the equation for s income is significant in model (M1), (M4) and
yearly data, suggesting that for annual, five year and five year average data, income
influences the variance of democracy. The negative and significant income coef-
ficient found for the five year, five year average and ten year lag in the equation
for n indicates that a higher income per capita level leads to a lower probability
of a country having a value of zero (autocracy) than a value between zero and one
in the next five and ten years. The evidence comes from the equation for t . The
positive and significant coefficient of income (for five, ten, twenty year and five
year average lags) suggests that a higher income induces a higher probability of a
6For s = 1, we jointly estimate the coefficients of mean and scale parameters with the previous
four lags.
7The result for yearly data are available on request.
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country having a value of one (democracy outcome) than a value between zero and
one8.
The OECD dummy is also significant in the equations for µ and s in some
cases. The positive sign in the equation for µ reflects the higher level of democracy
on average for OECD members relative to non-OECDs. Meanwhile, the positive
sign in the equation for s indicates that the OECD group has a higher variance.
This confirms the findings in Figure 2. The diagnostic plots for ten year intervals
are provided in Figure 3.
As a comparison, we provide results for the Polity IV data in Table 39. Table
3 suggests that our findings are not robust for the equations for µ and n , yet it is
more robust for the equations for s and t . Past income explains the non-constant
variance of democracy through the equation for s and the probability of being
democratic is consistently significant through the equation t . Further, the latter
evidence from t also indicates that in most cases rising income is significantly
associated with the probability of a country to achieve complete democratization,
whereas decreasing income is only in a few cases associated with the probability
of a country becoming fully autocratic. This fact indicates the existence of an
asymmetry in the way countries move along the “degree of democracy” line.
The difference between the OECD and non-OECD groups is less apparent here.
The dummy for OECD countries is significant and positive in the equation for µ in
only two cases. The OECD dummy is also positive and statistically significant in
the equation for t in one case.
8Yearly data shows mixed signs.
9 see Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix for the results obtained using other data set combinations.
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Table 2: Freedom House and Penn World Table GDP per capita
Dependent variable: 5 year 10 year 20 year 5 year average
democracy (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4)
Mean equation (µ)
Lag democracy 0.975*** -0.857*** -2.301*** 2.368***
(0.184) (0.277) (0.346) (0.214)
Lag log income per capita -0.028 0.574** -0.411 -0.021
(0.161) (0.285) (0.505) (0.162)
OECD(D) 2.180** 2.251*** 0.195 1.865**
(0.980) (0.677) (0.728) (0.914)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scale equation (s )
Lag Democracy -*** + No -***
Lag log income per capita + - No +
OECD(D) +* +*** No +
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Zero inflation equation (n)
Lag democracy -4.531*** -2.155** -1.284 -6.547***
(0.681) (0.884) (1.658) (0.947)
Lag log income per capita -0.454** -0.647 * -0.974 -0414*
(0.193) (0.329) (0.770) (0.217)
OECD(D) -1.449 -19.751 -13.344 -0.974
(1.057) (8.611e+3) (776.982) (1.109)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
One inflation equation (t)
Lag democracy 12.551*** 5.321*** 1.138 19.202***
(1.932) (1.241) (1.119) (2.974)
Lag log income per capita 2.893*** 3.541*** 4.046*** 3.175***
(0.450) (0.641) (0.933) (0.558)
OECD(D) -0.755 -0.373 0.682 -1.517**
(0.473) (0.591) (0.726) (0.596)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Observation 729 317 112 639
Country 117 106 69 118
Global deviance 84.527 9.895 -82.432 -117.297
AIC 364.527 259.895 83.568 162.704
SBC 1007.362 729.757 309.203 787.090
The coefficients are in logit form for the equations for µ and s , in log form for the equations for n and t . The
equation for s only shows the direction of relationship and its significance level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***). Standard errors are in parentheses with “qr” type, which assumes there is no correlation
among the parameters. Models M1-M3 are estimated using 5, 10 and 20 year intervals, respectively.
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Table 3: Polity IV and Penn World Table GDP per capita
Dependent variable: 5 year 10 year 20 year 5 year average
democracy (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4)
Mean equation (µ)
Lag democracy 1.231*** -0.647** -3.826*** 2.733***
(0.192) (0.321) (0.477) (0.218)
Lag log income per capita 0.070 0.086 -0.261 0.073
(0.169) (0.315) (0.684) (0.171)
OECD (D) 2.058*** 1.148 0.061 1.268*
(0.720) (0.728) (0.693) (0.670)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scale equation (s )
Lag democracy - +* +*** +**
Lag log income per capita + - -*** -
OECD (D) - +** - -
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Zero inflation equation (n)
Lag democracy -75.706*** -56.984* 5.647e-7 -93.691***
(20.593) (29.492) (1.607e+6) (31.673)
Lag log income per capita 0.456 0.471 1.119e-7 1.353
(0.724) (1.050) (7.855e+5) (1.163)
OECD (D) -12.883 -13.066 3.395e-7 -12.773
(1.331e+3) (1.367e+3) (1.506e+6) (2070.862)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
One inflation equation (t)
Lag democracy 35.099*** 7.100*** 4.541*** 41.937***
(5.086) (2.075) (1.509) (6.358)
Lag log income per capita 1.338*** 2.280*** 2.335** 1.222**
(0.441) (0.574) (1.009) (0.492)
OECD (D) 0.687 0.808 1.907** 0.709
(0.538) (0.583) (0.924) (0.608)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Observation 729 317 112 639
Country 118 106 69 119
Global deviance -446.343 -148.281 -195.667 -523.083
AIC -164.343 101.719 23.667 -241.083
SBC 483.083 571.582 210.124 387.764
The coefficients are in logit form for the equations for µ and s , in log form for the equations for n and t . The
equation for s only shows the direction of relationship and its significance level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***). Standard errors are in parentheses with “qr” type, which assumes there is no correlation
among the parameters. Models M1-M3 are estimated using 5, 10 and 20 year intervals, respectively.
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Results for the overall sample from the two alternative data sets generally in-
dicate a similar effect of lag income for the equations for s and t10. Additionally,
the sets were and to a large extent robust for the OECD dummy in the equations for
µ and s . Nevertheless, a detailed examination suggests that there is a sort of se-
lection bias. The differences in results mainly depend on which income variable is
used in the model. On the one hand, when using income data from the Penn World
Table, a positive association between income and democracy is found more often
than when using income data from Maddison. On the other hand, Maddison GDP
favors significance for the OECD dummy. Hence, we conclude that even though
the democracy indices are subject to measurement error, in our model specification
they are more robust than the income per capita variables11.
Table 4: Freedom House and Penn World Table GDP per capita for sub samples
Dependent 5 year 10 year 5 year average
variable: OECD non-OECD OECD non-OECD OECD non-OECD


























Country fe No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scale equation (s )
Lag democracy No -** No + No -*
Lag log income per capita -*** + - + -*** +
Country fe No No No No No No
Year fe No No No No No No

























Country fe No No No No No No
Year fe No No No No No No
One inflation equation (t)
Lag democracy 19.484*** 9.506*** 20.212** 3.405*** 23.938*** 16.300***
(3.672) (1.950) (7.028) (1.264) (4.979) (3.466)












Country fe No No No No No No
Year fe No No No No No No
Observation 216 513 109 208 190 449
Country 28 101 27 78 28 89
Global deviance -14.618 40.620 -17.550 -10.418 -50.171 -129.081
AIC 77.382 254.620 64.450 175.582 39.829 84.919
SBC 232.644 708.330 174.795 485.974 185.945 524.370
The coefficients are in logit form for the equations for µ and s , in log form for the equations for n and t . The
equation for s only shows the direction of relationship and its significance level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***). Standard errors are in parentheses with “qr” type, which assumes there is no correlation
among the parameters. Models M1-M3 are estimated using 5, 10 and 20 year intervals, respectively. Country
fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are used only when the algorithms converge.
Our further estimation for the OECD versus non-OECD subsamples (see Ta-
ble 4) shows that the positive association between income and democracy is only
statistically significant in the OECD countries. Whereas, the probability is signif-
icant for both subsamples. However, there is no evidence of positive association
10Results are robust to OECD dummy exclusion and are available on request.
11Results are robust to restricted samples where countries data sets are available in all four sources.
12
between OECD membership history and democracy12
12see Table A3 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Diagnostic plots for ten year intervals: overall sample (top panel) and
OECD (bottom panel)
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4.2 Discussion of the results
In this sub-section we provide specific examples that will allow us to help with
inference and with the interpretation of the sizes of the coefficients provided in the
main table of results (Table 2).
Firstly, in order to infer to what extent a higher level of income increases the
level of democracy we make use of a predictive analysis. Two countries with an
identical level of democracy but different level of income are selected. Those are
India, which represents lower middle income countries, and Brazil, which repre-
sents upper middle income countries. In 2000, both appeared to be at the upper
level of democracy, but never committed to be completely democratic.
Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of being fully democratic, given the
top five deciles of income for the whole sample. It suggests that provided with
the artificial higher levels of lag income, Brazil is more likely to become fully
democratic than India. The results using five year interval data, five year average
data, ten year interval data and twenty year interval data of Brazil are in favor
of full democracy in Brazil when the income drastically increases, i.e. at least in
percentile 80%. Meanwhile, India’s fully democratization is only supported by two
data sets13. In fact, the original levels of income (see Table A4 in the Appendix)
could not boost the likelihood of becoming fully democratic. The probabilities for
Brazil never exceed more than 0.5, while the chance for India is virtually zero. The
income differences between Brazil and India, also that the predicted probabilities
for full democracy increase when using the high level of artificial income, indicates
that income is an important factor in determining the probability to reach a fully
democratic regime.
Secondly, by examining the data we observe that the number of countries that
were never fully democratic or fully autocratic is 53 countries (122 countries) when
the democracy proxy comes from Freedom House (Polity IV) (see Table A7 in the
Appendix for the list of countries). These figures represent 31% (72%) of the total
number of countries in each sample. The size suggests that there is a moderate
fraction of countries according to the first source (a large fraction –according to the
second–) -that have always been partially democratic during the period analyzed.
The pattern of democracy path over time is provided in Figure 5. The results
using both sources (Freedom House in the left side of Figure 5 and Polity IV in
the right side) consistently support a similar story, for instance, there is no sign of
mean reversion for countries that were partially democratic. Instead, after a sharp
decrease in the early 1970s, there is a gradually upward trend from a lower baseline
to a more democratic regime on average. In particular, the transition seems to be
slower for Freedom House than for Polity IV, especially in the period from 1990
to 2000. Our estimations are in line with this visualization, indicating that there is
a good opportunity for countries in transition to become fully democratic because
they do not appear to get persistently trapped in the middle level of the democracy
13The predicted estimation for complete democracy using 80%, 90% and 100% percentiles is
provided in Table A5 and A6 in the Appendix.
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for complete democratization: India and Brazil in
2000
Note: Annual, five year and five year average lines for India overlap each other.
score.
5 Concluding remarks
Which comes first, income or democracy? The chicken and egg causality dilemma
reflects the existence of opposite theoretical perspectives in which empirical ev-
idence has been found to support each side. Inconclusive findings together with
statistical challenges have converted the study of the relationship into a far more
complex issue than what Aristotle proposed a long time ago. Among the ac-
knowledged statistical issues, we claim that the usual distributional assumption for
democracy as a response variable could be inappropriate. In particular, the use of
an unbounded distribution - such as a normal distribution - for a bounded variable
that has dominant observations around the boundaries of its domain could cause
problems. Furthermore, the conclusions derived from an analysis that rely on the
wrong underlying assumptions could be misleading.
Although we find almost no support for income causing democracy when mod-
elling the mean of democracy, we find that heteroscedasticity is an issue and that
higher lag income increases the probability of a country being democratic. As
the baseline evidence shows, we only find partial support for a positive correla-
tion between income and democracy when modeling the mean of democracy with
data every ten years and using income from the Penn World Table and democracy
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Figure 5: Democracy path of countries in transition towards democracy
Note: Calculated based on the average democracy level of the target countries for each democracy
data source. These arithmetic means are more representative since countries with extreme values
(0,1) are excluded.
from Freedom House. We acknowledge the fact that we do not address endogene-
ity issues in the way is usually done in the literature (using instrumental variables
approaches). Hence, we should not strictly talk about causality, but correlation.
We also find systematic differences between OECD and non-OECD samples
in the mean, variance and probabilities of zero and one inflation. OECD countries
are on average more democratic and evidence that higher income is positively as-
sociated with higher democracy is only present for this group. This finding support
the literature that the relationship between income and democracy is heterogenous.
Moreover, we find that using Maddison GDP, being an OECD member increases
the probability of being completely democratic while this is not the case when us-
ing Penn World Table data for income. The differences encountered when using
Penn World Table and Maddison data indicate that economic measurement seems
to matter and can influence the inferences that we draw. A caveat of our approach
is that we are unable to address the potential existence of a selection bias, since
countries accession to the OECD is partly based on their income per capita. We
leave this issue for further research.
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Appendix
Table A1: Freedom House and Maddison GDP per capita
Dependent variable: 5 year 10 year 20 year 5 year average
democracy (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4)
Mean equation (µ)
Lag democracy 1.094*** -0.714*** -1.638*** 1.535***
(1.673) (0.261) (0.190) (0.186)
Lag log income per capita -0.197 -0.305 0.326* -0.330**
(0.140) (0.271) (0.169) (0.149)
OECD (D) 2.529* 0.997 -0.432 4.424***
(1.319) (0.954) (0.661) (1.386)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scale equation (s )
Lag Democracy -*** + No -
Lag Log income per capita +*** +*** +*** +
OECD (D) +** +*** - +*
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Zero inflation equation (n)
Lag democracy -2.281** -3.295*** -3.453 ** -8.941***
(1.036) (0.712) (1.333) (1.104)
Lag log income per capita -0.078 -0.068 0.195 -0.035
(0.062) (0.091) (0.167) (0.076)
OECD (D) -2.281 -20.728 -19.281 -16.993
(1.036) (7.946e+3) (5.256e+3) (1.588+e3)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
One inflation equation (t)
Lag democracy 14.879*** 7.170*** 2.667*** 21.498***
(1.827) (1.213) (0.838) (2.795)
Lag log income per capita 0.178 0.170 0.253 0.218
(0.111) (0.140) (0.198) (0.137)
OECD (D) 1.203*** 1.740*** 1.993*** 0.844*
(0.373) (0.454) (0.566) (0.457)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Observation 858 384 141 748
Country 136 127 88 136
Global deviance 187.998 109.918 -79.631 -165.615
AIC 505.998 401.918 128.370 150.385
SBC 1261.98 978.712 435.041 879.935
The coefficients are in logit form for the equations for µ and s , in log form for the equations for n and t . The
equation for s only shows the direction of relationship and its significance level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***). Standard errors are in parentheses with “qr” type, which assumes there is no correlation
among the parameters. Models M1-M3 are estimated using 5, 10 and 20 year intervals, respectively.
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Table A2: Polity IV and Maddison GDP per capita
Dependent variable: 5 year 10 year 20 year 5 year average
democracy (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4)
Mean equation (µ)
Lag democracy 1.477*** -0.309 -2.253*** 2.063***
(0.177) (0.288) (0.459) (0.181)
Lag log income per capita 0.102 0.146 -0.251 0.056
(0.152) (0.271) (0.436) (0.140)
OECD (D) 1.515** 2.222** 4.842*** 1.715***
(0.639) (1.077) (1.258) (0.621)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scale equation (s )
Lag Democracy + +** No -***
Lag Income per capita +* + +*** +
OECD (D) - +*** -*** +
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Zero inflation equation (n)
Lag democracy -81.900*** -84.980*** -947.178 -113.832***
(12.818) (23.682) (2.453e+6) (26.146)
Lag log income per capita 0.097 0.273 8.363*** 0.360
(0.215) (0.341) (1.109) (0.300)
OECD (D) -13.207 -14.515 14.040 -13.039
(1.40e+3) (3.428e+3) (1.014e+6) (3.637e+3)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
One inflation equation (t)
Lag democracy 38.408*** 9.567*** 5.759*** 40.592***
(5.146) (2.148) (1.226) (5.924)
Lag log income per capita -0.229 -0.217 -0.556** -0.206
(0.144) (0.150) (0.280) (0.162)
OECD (D) 2.500*** 2.936*** 4.054*** 2.503***
(0.533) (0.573) (1.012) (0.608)
Country fe No No No No
Year fe No No No No
Observation 858 384 141 748
Country 136 127 89 136
Global deviance -629.735 -211.350 -230.628 -760.734
AIC 311.735 80.650 -18.628 -444.734
SBC 444.248 657.444 293.941 284.816
The coefficients are in logit form for the equations for µ and s , in log form for the equations for n and t . The
equation for s only shows the direction of relationship and its significance level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***). Standard errors are in parentheses with “qr” type, which assumes there is no correlation
among the parameters. Models M1-M3 are estimated using 5, 10 and 20 year intervals, respectively.
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Table A3: Modeling the relationship between OECD membership history and
democracy
Dependent variable: 5 year 10 year 5 year average
democracy (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6)
Mean equation (µ)
Lag democracy 1.334** 1.743*** -2.157*** 0.004 2.931*** 3.053***
(0.556) (0.0.497) (0.608) (0.781) (0.637) (0.507)












Lag OECD (D) -0.180 0.470 0.377 0.480 0.231 0.644*
(0.280) (0.391) (0.514) (0.542) (0.252) (0.354)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fe No No No No Yes Yes
Scale equation (s )
Lag democracy -*** -*** - - -*** -**
Lag log income per capita -*** -*** - -*** -*** -***
Country fe No No No No No No
Year fe No No No No No Yes
One inflation equation (t)
Lag democracy 19.626*** 21.867*** 21.204*** 7.194** 24.125*** 23.249***
(3.823) (5.493) (7.382) (3.136) (5.221) (5.915)












Lag OECD (D) 1.145* 0.350 1.050 -0.239 1.156 0.299
(0.625) (0.555) (1.183) (0.812) (0.705) (0.591)
Country fe No No No No No No
Year fe No No No No No No
Observation 216 216 109 109 190 190
Country 28 28 28 28 28 28
Global deviance 2.914 1.174 -12.468 6.228 -41.169 -32.020
AIC 82.914 81.174 65.532 84.228 38.831 47.980
SBC 217.925 216.814 170.495 189.191 168.712 177.861
The coefficients are in logit form for the equations for µ and s , in log form for the equations for n and t . The
equation for s only shows the direction of relationship and its significance level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***). Standard errors are in parentheses with “qr” type, which assumes there is no correlation
among the parameters. Country fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are used only when the algorithms converge.
Models with odds number use Freedom House variable, models with even numbers use Polity4 variable. The
income variable for all models is from Penn World Table.
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Table A4: The original level of lag log income and probabilities of complete
democracy in 2000
India Brazil
Lag log income Probability Lag log income Probability
Five year 8.201 1.575e-06 8.819 0.339
Ten year 7.955 1.460e-03 8.735 0.482
Twenty year 7.547 4.061e-03 8.761 0.422
Five year average 8.218 5.941e-08 8.833 0.054
Predictions use data source from Penn World Table and Freedom House.
Table A5: Predicted probabilities for complete democracy in India in 2000
Income percentile
Five year Ten year Twenty year Five year average
80% 4.999e-05 0.179 0.865 2.328e-06
90% 1.778e-04 0.498 0.973 9.195e-06
100% 1.230e-03 0.910 0.980 7.507e-05
Income percentiles are extracted from Penn World Table 1960-2000 and predicted probabilites of democracy is
using Freedom House.
Table A6: Predicted probabilities for complete democracy in Brazil in 2000
Income percentile
Five year Ten year Twenty year Five year average
80% 0.699 0.889 0.886 0.224
90% 0.888 0.973 0.977 0.525
100% 0.981 0.997 0.998 0.897
Income percentiles are extracted from Penn World Table 1960-2000 and predicted probabilites of democracy is
using Freedom House.
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Table A7: List of countries in Figure 5
No. Contry No. Country No. Country No. Country
1 Angola* 41 Finland 81 Mexico 121 Syrian Arab Republic
2 Albania 42 Fiji** 82 Mali 122 Chad
3 United Arab Emirates* 43 France 83 Myanmar* 123 Togo
4 Argentina 44 Gabon 84 Mongolia* 124 Thailand
5 Australia 45 United Kingdom 85 Mozambique 125 Trinidad and Tobago
6 Austria 46 Ghana 86 Mauritania 126 Tunisia
7 Burundi 47 Guinea 87 Mauritius 127 Turkey
8 Belgium 48 Gambia, The 88 Malawi 128 Taiwan
9 Benin 49 Guinea-Bissau 89 Malaysia 129 Tanzania
10 Burkina Faso 50 Equatorial Guinea 90 Namibia* 130 Uganda
11 Bangladesh 51 Greece 91 Niger 131 Uruguay
12 Bulgaria 52 Guatemala 92 Nigeria 132 United States
13 Bahrain* 53 Guyana** 93 Nicaragua 133 USSR*
14 Bolivia 54 Honduras 94 Netherlands 134 Venezuela, RB
15 Brazil 55 Haiti 95 Norway 135 Vietnam
16 Botswana 56 Hungary 96 Nepal 136 Yemen
17 Central African Republic 57 Indonesia 97 New Zealand 137 South Africa
18 Canada 58 India 98 Oman* 138 Congo, Dem. Rep.
19 Switzerland 59 Ireland 99 Pakistan-post-1972 139 Zambia
20 Chile 60 Iran 100 Panama 140 Zimbabwe*
21 China 61 Iraq* 101 Peru
22 Cote d’Ivoire 62 Iceland** 102 Philippines
23 Cameroon 63 Israel 103 Papua New Guinea**
24 Congo, Rep. 64 Italy 104 Poland
25 Colombia 65 Jamaica 105 Korea, Dem. Rep.*
26 Comoros 66 Jordan 106 Portugal
27 Costa Rica 67 Japan 107 Paraguay
28 Cuba 68 Kenya 108 Qatar*
29 Cyprus** 69 Cambodia 109 Romania
30 Czechoslovakia* 70 Korea, Rep. 110 Russia
31 Germany 71 Kuwait* 111 Rwanda
32 Djibouti* 72 Lao PDR* 112 Saudi Arabia*
33 Denmark 73 Liberia* 113 Sudan*
34 Dominican Republic 74 Libya* 114 Senegal
35 Algeria 75 Sri Lanka 115 Singapore
36 Ecuador 76 Lesotho 116 Sierra Leone
37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 77 Lithuania 117 El Savador
38 Spain 78 Latvia 118 Somalia*
39 Estonia 79 Morocco 119 Sweden
40 Ethiopia pre-1993 80 Madagascar 120 Swaziland*
(*) excluded from Penn World Table; (**) excluded from Maddison GDP.
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